Evals, safety & limits
~7 min read
Final lesson of module one: how the field keeps score, what the guardrails do and don't do, and the failure modes you must design around.
How models are measured
- Knowledge & reasoning benchmarks (MMLU, GPQA) — multiple-choice exams. Cheap, saturated, and gameable: training on near-duplicates of test items (contamination) inflates scores without improving ability.
- Agentic benchmarks (SWE-bench) — can the model fix real issues in real repos, judged by tests? Far more informative for coding tools — and far more expensive to run.
- Human preference arenas — blind A/B votes on open prompts. Capture taste and usefulness, inherit human biases (verbosity wins more often than it should).
Read any single number with the recipe in mind: what task, what judge, what contamination controls? A 5-point gap means nothing without that context.
Safety: what guardrails are
Refusals, content filters, and safety fine-tuning shape which behaviors surface — they don't remove the underlying capabilities (recall the training lesson: manners, not brain surgery). Jailbreaks — prompts engineered to bypass refusals — work often enough that you should treat any safety property as probabilistic, never as a guarantee your system can rely on.
Never build a control that fails open on model obedience. If harm follows from the model complying, the control belongs outside the model — in code, permissions, and human review.
Limits to design around
- Hallucination is structural. Fluency ≠ truth. Anything load-bearing (prices, doses, commands that delete) gets verified against a source of truth, not a second sampling.
- Long context degrades judgment. Retrieval survives scale better than reasoning does — models find the needle and still fumble the synthesis. Keep the working set small; summarize or retrieve rather than dumping.
- Tool use needs supervision. Agents that can act (shell, payments, merges) need the same controls as junior engineers with production access: scopes, dry-runs, and review gates on irreversible actions.
Our position (plainly stated)
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1.A model leads a benchmark by 3 points. Before updating your priors, you ask…
2.Why can't refusal training be your only safety control for an agent with shell access?
3.Which scales worse with context length: finding a fact, or synthesizing an answer from many facts?